The US anthrax debacle, where live samples of the spore-forming disease anthrax were shipped to 28 facilities across the US, an army base in South Korea and three laboratories in Canada accidentally, is a timely reminder of the dangers we face when working with biohazardous agents.
The anthrax was sent from an army lab in Utah, and was supposed to have been rendered inactive by Department of Defense scientists before being shipped for research purposes. However, the spores, which are known to be capable of surviving in extreme conditions and dormancy for 50 years or more, were found to be live.
As yet, it appears no one has been taken ill with anthrax and those few people who may have been in contact with the material are being treated with antibodies and vaccines as a precaution. The US Department of Defense is set to launch a comprehensive review of its laboratory procedures, processes and protocols associated with inactivating the anthrax.
Anthrax is just one of many biohazards, of whose potential lethality to human and animal life we are acutely aware; but with the advancements in life science and synthetic biotechnology, we are handling many more potentially biohazardous materials and even creating new ones.
Much of this research is carried out with the laudable aims of treating disease, improving the sustainability of our world, or repairing damage already done to our ecosystem. However, ensuring that our biosafety expertise is as advanced as our creativity when it comes to inventing new biohazards is just as important.
It is timely that the Wyss Institute for Biologically Inspired Engineering has put out for open discussion its biosafety protocols designed to obviate future risks from new research. Such discussion is vital and the more labs that engage in the conversation, the greater levels of biosafety will be attained around the world. As the US example reminds us, such protocols must take account of the impossible happening – as it so often does.
